Strategic Misrepresentation - Revision history

Kristoffer Rander at 21:56, 9 May 2023

2023-05-09T21:56:56Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 21:56, 9 May 2023
Line 86:		Line 86:
	1 '''Optimism bias''' is the tendency to be overly optimistic about planned actions, leading to overestimation of positive events and underestimation of negative ones.		1 '''Optimism bias''' is the tendency to be overly optimistic about planned actions, leading to overestimation of positive events and underestimation of negative ones.

	2 '''Planning fallacy''' ~~underestimating~~ costs, ~~schedules and~~ overestimating outcomes.		2 '''Planning fallacy''' is the tendency to underestimate the time, resources, and costs required to complete a project, while overestimating the expected outcomes. This bias can lead to missed deadlines, cost overruns, and subpar results.

	3 '''Uniqueness bias''' ~~is the~~ tendency to perceive ~~one's~~ project as more unique ~~or singular~~ than it actually is~~. The planning fallacy (on a large scale) is the tendency to underestimate costs, risks, and schedule and overestimate benefits and opportunities~~.		3 '''Uniqueness bias''' The tendency to perceive a project as being more unique than it actually is.

	4 '''Overconfidence bias''' refers to ~~having excessive~~ confidence in ~~one's~~ own answers or abilities when answering questions.		4 '''Overconfidence bias''' refers to the tendency for individuals to have too much confidence in their own answers or abilities when answering questions. This bias can lead to poor decision-making, as individuals may overlook important information or fail to consider alternative viewpoints.

	5 '''Hindsight bias''', ~~also known as the "I-knew-it-all-along effect,"~~ is the tendency to ~~perceive~~ past events as predictable~~, despite evidence~~ to ~~the contrary~~.		5 '''Hindsight bias''', is the tendency to see past mistakes and events as more predictable than they actually were. This bias can lead to a false sense of security and a failure to learn from past experiences.

	6 '''Availability bias''' is the tendency to overestimate the likelihood of events that are more easily retrievable or available in memory.		6 '''Availability bias''' is the tendency to overestimate the likelihood of events that are more easily retrievable or available in memory. This bias can lead to a failure to consider less salient but more relevant information, resulting in poor decision-making.

	7 '''Base-rate fallacy''' is the tendency to focus on specific information related to a particular case or small sample, while ignoring more general base-rate information.		7 '''Base-rate fallacy''' refers to the tendency to focus on specific information related to a particular case or small sample, while ignoring more general base-rate information. This bias can lead to faulty conclusions and poor decision-making.

	8 '''Anchoring''' is the tendency to rely too heavily on the first piece of information acquired when making decisions, often leading to errors in judgment.		8 '''Anchoring''' is the tendency to rely too heavily on the first piece of information acquired when making decisions, often leading to errors in judgment. This bias can lead to overconfidence and a failure to consider alternative viewpoints.

	9 '''Escalation''' ~~of commitment,~~ also known as the sunk-cost fallacy, is the tendency to justify increased investment in a decision based on the cumulative prior investment, even in the face of new evidence suggesting the decision may be wrong.		9 '''Escalation''' also known as the sunk-cost fallacy, is the tendency to justify increased investment in a decision based on the cumulative prior investment, even in the face of new evidence suggesting the decision may be wrong. This bias can lead to a failure to cut losses and a persistence in pursuing a failing course of action.

	10 ''' Illusion of control'''		10 ''' Illusion of control'''
	A false belief that individuals have more control over outcomes, decisions, and actions of external actors.		is a false belief that individuals have more control over outcomes, decisions, and actions of external actors than they actually do. This bias can lead to overconfidence, a failure to consider alternative viewpoints, and poor decision-making.

	It’s worth mentioning that other types of behavioral biases exist such as conservatism bias, normalcy bias, recency bias, probability neglect, the ostrich effect, and more. These 10 biases may be considered the most influential regarding management.		It’s worth mentioning that other types of behavioral biases exist such as conservatism bias, normalcy bias, recency bias, probability neglect, the ostrich effect, and more. These 10 biases may be considered the most influential regarding management.

Kristoffer Rander at 21:40, 9 May 2023

2023-05-09T21:40:05Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 21:40, 9 May 2023
Line 12:		Line 12:
	Inaccuracy in forecasts is a significant problem in management since they often lead to cost overruns. Despite claims of improved forecasting models and better data, forecasting accuracy has not improved, as highlighted by two papers in the Journal of the American Planning Association. Flyvbjerg, B., Skamris Holm, M. K. & Buhl, S. L. (2002) The inaccuracy in cost forecasts for transportation infrastructure projects was found to be on average 44.7% for rail, 33.8% for bridges and tunnels, and 20.4% for roads. Furthermore, the accuracy of rail and road traffic forecasts has not improved over a 30-year period. Various technical, psychological, and political-economic explanations for inaccuracy in forecasting have been tested, but psychological and political-economic explanations better account for inaccurate forecasts. Psychological explanations account for inaccuracy in terms of optimism bias, while political-economic explanations account for strategic misrepresentation in the decision-making process. Flyvbjerg B (2008) [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/233258056_Curbing_Optimism_Bias_and_Strategic_Misrepresentation_in_Planning_Reference_Class_Forecasting_in_Practice]		Inaccuracy in forecasts is a significant problem in management since they often lead to cost overruns. Despite claims of improved forecasting models and better data, forecasting accuracy has not improved, as highlighted by two papers in the Journal of the American Planning Association. Flyvbjerg, B., Skamris Holm, M. K. & Buhl, S. L. (2002) The inaccuracy in cost forecasts for transportation infrastructure projects was found to be on average 44.7% for rail, 33.8% for bridges and tunnels, and 20.4% for roads. Furthermore, the accuracy of rail and road traffic forecasts has not improved over a 30-year period. Various technical, psychological, and political-economic explanations for inaccuracy in forecasting have been tested, but psychological and political-economic explanations better account for inaccurate forecasts. Psychological explanations account for inaccuracy in terms of optimism bias, while political-economic explanations account for strategic misrepresentation in the decision-making process. Flyvbjerg B (2008) [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/233258056_Curbing_Optimism_Bias_and_Strategic_Misrepresentation_in_Planning_Reference_Class_Forecasting_in_Practice]

	[[File:Picture1.jpg\|400px\|thumb\|right\|~~alt text~~]]		[[File:Picture1.jpg\|400px\|thumb\|right\|'''Picture 1''' The extent to which forecasting inaccuracies can be attributed to optimism bias and strategic misrepresentation, in relation to the influence of political and organizational pressure, is being examined in terms of explanatory power. Flyvbjerg, B. (2008).]]

	== Strategic misinterpretation and lying ==		== Strategic misinterpretation and lying ==
Line 72:		Line 72:
	Reference class forecasting is a systematic approach used to gain an objective viewpoint on planned actions. The process involves three key steps: (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979b, p. 326).		Reference class forecasting is a systematic approach used to gain an objective viewpoint on planned actions. The process involves three key steps: (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979b, p. 326).

	(1) '''Identify a relevant reference''', this could bed a similar project that is broad enough to be statistically meaningful but narrow enough to be truly comparable with the specific project. However, this might not always be possible to find in a managerial context, suitable projects can be found in ~~table (…)~~		(1) '''Identify a relevant reference''', this could bed a similar project that is broad enough to be statistically meaningful but narrow enough to be truly comparable with the specific project. However, this might not always be possible to find in a managerial context, suitable projects can be found in Table 1

	(2) '''Establish a probability distribution''' for the selected reference class based on credible, empirical data for a sufficient number of projects.		(2) '''Establish a probability distribution''' for the selected reference class based on credible, empirical data for a sufficient number of projects.

	(3) '''Comparing the specific project''' with the reference class distribution to determine the most probable outcome for the specific project.		(3) '''Comparing the specific project''' with the reference class distribution to determine the most probable outcome for the specific project.
	[[File:Table.png\|400px\|thumb\|Right\|~~alt text~~]]		[[File:Table.png\|400px\|thumb\|Right\|'''Table 1''' Table of suitable project fields to do reference class forecasting. Flyvbjerg, B. (2008).]]
	== Recent developments ==		== Recent developments ==

Kristoffer Rander at 21:34, 9 May 2023

2023-05-09T21:34:03Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 21:34, 9 May 2023
Line 9:		Line 9:

	'''Cost overruns'''		'''Cost overruns'''
	Inaccuracy in forecasts is a significant problem in management since they often lead to ~~Cost~~ overruns. Despite claims of improved forecasting models and better data, forecasting accuracy has not improved, as highlighted by two papers in the Journal of the American Planning Association. (….) The inaccuracy in cost forecasts for transportation infrastructure projects was found to be on average 44.7% for rail, 33.8% for bridges and tunnels, and 20.4% for roads. Furthermore, the accuracy of rail and road traffic forecasts has not improved over a 30-year period. Various technical, psychological, and political-economic explanations for inaccuracy in forecasting have been tested, but psychological and political-economic explanations better account for inaccurate forecasts. Psychological explanations account for inaccuracy in terms of optimism bias, while political-economic explanations account for strategic misrepresentation in the decision-making process. Flyvbjerg B (2008) [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/233258056_Curbing_Optimism_Bias_and_Strategic_Misrepresentation_in_Planning_Reference_Class_Forecasting_in_Practice]
			Inaccuracy in forecasts is a significant problem in management since they often lead to cost overruns. Despite claims of improved forecasting models and better data, forecasting accuracy has not improved, as highlighted by two papers in the Journal of the American Planning Association. Flyvbjerg, B., Skamris Holm, M. K. & Buhl, S. L. (2002) The inaccuracy in cost forecasts for transportation infrastructure projects was found to be on average 44.7% for rail, 33.8% for bridges and tunnels, and 20.4% for roads. Furthermore, the accuracy of rail and road traffic forecasts has not improved over a 30-year period. Various technical, psychological, and political-economic explanations for inaccuracy in forecasting have been tested, but psychological and political-economic explanations better account for inaccurate forecasts. Psychological explanations account for inaccuracy in terms of optimism bias, while political-economic explanations account for strategic misrepresentation in the decision-making process. Flyvbjerg B (2008) [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/233258056_Curbing_Optimism_Bias_and_Strategic_Misrepresentation_in_Planning_Reference_Class_Forecasting_in_Practice]

	[[File:Picture1.jpg\|400px\|thumb\|right\|alt text]]		[[File:Picture1.jpg\|400px\|thumb\|right\|alt text]]
Line 110:		Line 111:

	Muta, S. A. (2014). "The Art of Deception in International Relations."		Muta, S. A. (2014). "The Art of Deception in International Relations."

			Flyvbjerg, B., Skamris Holm, M. K. & Buhl, S. L. (2002) Underestimating costs in public works projects: Error or lie?, Journal of the American Planning Association, 68(3), Summer, pp. 279–295.

	A. (2013, December 21). "Strategic Misrepresentation – Why Do Projects Fail?" [https://calleam.com/WTPF/?p=6141]		A. (2013, December 21). "Strategic Misrepresentation – Why Do Projects Fail?" [https://calleam.com/WTPF/?p=6141]

Kristoffer Rander at 20:52, 9 May 2023

2023-05-09T20:52:26Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 20:52, 9 May 2023
Line 76:		Line 76:

	(3) '''Comparing the specific project''' with the reference class distribution to determine the most probable outcome for the specific project.		(3) '''Comparing the specific project''' with the reference class distribution to determine the most probable outcome for the specific project.
			[[File:Table.png\|400px\|thumb\|Right\|alt text]]
	== Recent developments ==		== Recent developments ==

Kristoffer Rander at 20:48, 9 May 2023

2023-05-09T20:48:54Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 20:48, 9 May 2023
Line 70:		Line 70:

	Reference class forecasting is a systematic approach used to gain an objective viewpoint on planned actions. The process involves three key steps: (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979b, p. 326).		Reference class forecasting is a systematic approach used to gain an objective viewpoint on planned actions. The process involves three key steps: (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979b, p. 326).
	(1) ~~identify~~ a relevant reference, this could bed a similar project that is broad enough to be statistically meaningful but narrow enough to be truly comparable with the specific project. However, this might not always be possible to find in a managerial context, suitable projects can be found in table (…)
	(2) Establish a probability distribution for the selected reference class based on credible, empirical data for a sufficient number of projects.		(1) '''Identify a relevant reference''', this could bed a similar project that is broad enough to be statistically meaningful but narrow enough to be truly comparable with the specific project. However, this might not always be possible to find in a managerial context, suitable projects can be found in table (…)
	(3) ~~comparing~~ the specific project with the reference class distribution to determine the most probable outcome for the specific project.
			(2) '''Establish a probability distribution''' for the selected reference class based on credible, empirical data for a sufficient number of projects.

			(3) '''Comparing the specific project''' with the reference class distribution to determine the most probable outcome for the specific project.

	== Recent developments ==		== Recent developments ==

Kristoffer Rander at 20:47, 9 May 2023

2023-05-09T20:47:47Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 20:47, 9 May 2023
Line 11:		Line 11:
	Inaccuracy in forecasts is a significant problem in management since they often lead to Cost overruns. Despite claims of improved forecasting models and better data, forecasting accuracy has not improved, as highlighted by two papers in the Journal of the American Planning Association. (….) The inaccuracy in cost forecasts for transportation infrastructure projects was found to be on average 44.7% for rail, 33.8% for bridges and tunnels, and 20.4% for roads. Furthermore, the accuracy of rail and road traffic forecasts has not improved over a 30-year period. Various technical, psychological, and political-economic explanations for inaccuracy in forecasting have been tested, but psychological and political-economic explanations better account for inaccurate forecasts. Psychological explanations account for inaccuracy in terms of optimism bias, while political-economic explanations account for strategic misrepresentation in the decision-making process. Flyvbjerg B (2008) [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/233258056_Curbing_Optimism_Bias_and_Strategic_Misrepresentation_in_Planning_Reference_Class_Forecasting_in_Practice]		Inaccuracy in forecasts is a significant problem in management since they often lead to Cost overruns. Despite claims of improved forecasting models and better data, forecasting accuracy has not improved, as highlighted by two papers in the Journal of the American Planning Association. (….) The inaccuracy in cost forecasts for transportation infrastructure projects was found to be on average 44.7% for rail, 33.8% for bridges and tunnels, and 20.4% for roads. Furthermore, the accuracy of rail and road traffic forecasts has not improved over a 30-year period. Various technical, psychological, and political-economic explanations for inaccuracy in forecasting have been tested, but psychological and political-economic explanations better account for inaccurate forecasts. Psychological explanations account for inaccuracy in terms of optimism bias, while political-economic explanations account for strategic misrepresentation in the decision-making process. Flyvbjerg B (2008) [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/233258056_Curbing_Optimism_Bias_and_Strategic_Misrepresentation_in_Planning_Reference_Class_Forecasting_in_Practice]

	[[File:Picture1.jpg]]		[[File:Picture1.jpg\|400px\|thumb\|right\|alt text]]

	== Strategic misinterpretation and lying ==		== Strategic misinterpretation and lying ==

Kristoffer Rander at 20:09, 9 May 2023

2023-05-09T20:09:00Z

Kristoffer Rander at 20:07, 9 May 2023

2023-05-09T20:07:13Z

Show changes

Kristoffer Rander at 19:41, 9 May 2023

2023-05-09T19:41:36Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 19:41, 9 May 2023
Line 98:		Line 98:

	Muta, S. A. (2014). "The Art of Deception in International Relations."		Muta, S. A. (2014). "The Art of Deception in International Relations."
	A. (2013, December 21). "Strategic Misrepresentation – Why Do Projects Fail?" https://calleam.com/WTPF/?p=6141
	Donnenwerth, C. B. (2007). "Communication and Deception." American Planning Association. (1991). "AICP Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct." Adopted October 1978, amended October 1991. http://www.planning.org		A. (2013, December 21). "Strategic Misrepresentation – Why Do Projects Fail?" [https://calleam.com/WTPF/?p=6141]
	Flyvbjerg, B. (1996). "The Dark Side of Planning: Rationality and Realrationalität." Flyvbjerg, B. (2005). "Design by Deception: The Politics of Megaproject Approval." Harvard Design Magazine, 22(Spring/Summer), 50-59.
	Flyvbjerg, B. (2008). "Curbing Optimism Bias and Strategic Misrepresentation in Planning: Reference Class Forecasting in Practice." https://www.researchgate.net/publication/233258056_Curbing_Optimism_Bias_and_Strategic_Misrepresentation_in_Planning_Reference_Class_Forecasting_in_Practice		Donnenwerth, C. B. (2007). "Communication and Deception." American Planning Association. (1991). "AICP Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct." Adopted October 1978, amended October 1991. [http://www.planning.org]
	Flyvbjerg, B. (2021). "Top-Ten Behavioral Biases in Project Management: An Overview." https://arxiv.org/abs/2202.00125
	Flyvbjerg, B. (2022, February 12). "Strategic Misrepresentation: The Blind Spot in Behavioral Economics." Medium. https://medium.com/geekculture/strategic-misrepresentation-the-blind-spot-in-behavioral-economics-8896b078d2c4		Flyvbjerg, B. (1996). "The Dark Side of Planning: Rationality and Realrationalität." Flyvbjerg, B. (2005). "Design by Deception: The Politics of Megaproject Approval."
	Greg Krawczyk. LinkedIn, 7. March, 2023. " How to mitigate strategic misrepresentation and unlock data, a project management focus. " by https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/how-mitigate-strategic-misrepresentation-unlock-data-project-greg/
			Harvard Design Magazine, 22(Spring/Summer), 50-59.

			Flyvbjerg, B. (2008). "Curbing Optimism Bias and Strategic Misrepresentation in Planning: Reference Class Forecasting in Practice." [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/233258056_Curbing_Optimism_Bias_and_Strategic_Misrepresentation_in_Planning_Reference_Class_Forecasting_in_Practice]

			Flyvbjerg, B. (2021). "Top-Ten Behavioral Biases in Project Management: An Overview." [https://arxiv.org/abs/2202.00125]

			Flyvbjerg, B. (2022, February 12). "Strategic Misrepresentation: The Blind Spot in Behavioral Economics." Medium. [https://medium.com/geekculture/strategic-misrepresentation-the-blind-spot-in-behavioral-economics-8896b078d2c4]

			Greg Krawczyk. LinkedIn, 7. March, 2023. " How to mitigate strategic misrepresentation and unlock data, a project management focus. " by
			[https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/how-mitigate-strategic-misrepresentation-unlock-data-project-greg/]

Kristoffer Rander at 19:24, 9 May 2023

2023-05-09T19:24:51Z

Show changes

← Older revision		Revision as of 20:09, 9 May 2023
Line 81:		Line 81:

	1 '''Optimism bias''' is the tendency to be overly optimistic about planned actions, leading to overestimation of positive events and underestimation of negative ones.		1 '''Optimism bias''' is the tendency to be overly optimistic about planned actions, leading to overestimation of positive events and underestimation of negative ones.

	2 '''Planning fallacy''' underestimating costs, schedules and overestimating outcomes.		2 '''Planning fallacy''' underestimating costs, schedules and overestimating outcomes.

	3 '''Uniqueness bias''' is the tendency to perceive one's project as more unique or singular than it actually is. The planning fallacy (on a large scale) is the tendency to underestimate costs, risks, and schedule and overestimate benefits and opportunities.		3 '''Uniqueness bias''' is the tendency to perceive one's project as more unique or singular than it actually is. The planning fallacy (on a large scale) is the tendency to underestimate costs, risks, and schedule and overestimate benefits and opportunities.

	4 '''Overconfidence bias''' refers to having excessive confidence in one's own answers or abilities when answering questions.		4 '''Overconfidence bias''' refers to having excessive confidence in one's own answers or abilities when answering questions.

	5 '''Hindsight bias''', also known as the "I-knew-it-all-along effect," is the tendency to perceive past events as predictable, despite evidence to the contrary.		5 '''Hindsight bias''', also known as the "I-knew-it-all-along effect," is the tendency to perceive past events as predictable, despite evidence to the contrary.

	6 '''Availability bias''' is the tendency to overestimate the likelihood of events that are more easily retrievable or available in memory.		6 '''Availability bias''' is the tendency to overestimate the likelihood of events that are more easily retrievable or available in memory.

	7 '''Base-rate fallacy''' is the tendency to focus on specific information related to a particular case or small sample, while ignoring more general base-rate information.		7 '''Base-rate fallacy''' is the tendency to focus on specific information related to a particular case or small sample, while ignoring more general base-rate information.

	8 '''Anchoring''' is the tendency to rely too heavily on the first piece of information acquired when making decisions, often leading to errors in judgment.		8 '''Anchoring''' is the tendency to rely too heavily on the first piece of information acquired when making decisions, often leading to errors in judgment.

	9 '''Escalation''' of commitment, also known as the sunk-cost fallacy, is the tendency to justify increased investment in a decision based on the cumulative prior investment, even in the face of new evidence suggesting the decision may be wrong.		9 '''Escalation''' of commitment, also known as the sunk-cost fallacy, is the tendency to justify increased investment in a decision based on the cumulative prior investment, even in the face of new evidence suggesting the decision may be wrong.
	10 '''Illusion of control'''
			10 ''' Illusion of control'''
	A false belief that individuals have more control over outcomes, decisions, and actions of external actors.		A false belief that individuals have more control over outcomes, decisions, and actions of external actors.

	It’s worth mentioning that other types of behavioral biases exist such as: conservatism bias, normalcy bias, recency bias, probability neglect, the ostrich effect, and more. These 10 biases may be considered the most influential regarding management.		It’s worth mentioning that other types of behavioral biases exist such as conservatism bias, normalcy bias, recency bias, probability neglect, the ostrich effect, and more. These 10 biases may be considered the most influential regarding management.
	Flyvbjerg B (2021) [https://arxiv.org/abs/2202.00125]		Flyvbjerg B (2021) [https://arxiv.org/abs/2202.00125]

			== Refrences: ==

	Muta, S. A. (2014). "The Art of Deception in International Relations."		Muta, S. A. (2014). "The Art of Deception in International Relations."